Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2000

The Rights of Statistical People
Lisa Heinzerling
Georgetown University Law Center, heinzerl@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/327

24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 189-207 (2000)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Law and Economics Commons

GEORGETOWN LAW
Faculty Publications

April 2010

The Rights of Statistical People
24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 189-207 (2000)

Lisa Heinzerling
Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center
heinzerl@law.georgetown.edu
This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/327/
Posted with permission of the author

THE RIGHTS OF STATISTICAL PEOPLE
Lisa Heinzerling*
The use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the wisdom of lifesaving regulatory programs presents a puzzle. Deciding to allow one person to harm, even to kill, another person on the basis of how much it
costs the person doing the harm to refrain from doing it denies the person
harmed a right against harm. It makes a person's freedom from harm,
indeed her life, contingent upon the financial profile of the lifethreatening activity.
The puzzle is that we do not allow this kind of cost-benefit balancing in all life-threatening contexts. We do not, for example, believe that
so long as it is worth $10 million to one person to see another person
dead, and so long as current estimates of the value of human life are
lower than $10 million, it is acceptable for the first person to shoot and
kill the second. Indeed, in this setting we refrain entirely from placing a
monetary value on life. Yet when it comes to regulatory programs that
prevent deaths-deaths also due to the actions of other people-it has
become commonplace to argue that the people doing the harm should be
allowed to act so long as it would cost more for them to stop doing the
harm than the harm is worth in monetary terms. Why are these two situations coming to be viewed so differently?
In this Comment, I argue that the use of cost-benefit analysis to
evaluate life-saving regulatory programs has, in a society that eschews
reliance on cost-benefit analysis in other life-saving situations, been
justified by the creation of a new kind of entity-the statistical person. A
primary feature of the statistical person, as I will explain, is that she is
unidentified; she is no one's sister, or daughter, or mother. Indeed, in one
conception, the statistical person is not a person at all, but rather only a
collection of risks. By distinguishing statistical lives from the lives of
those we know, economic analysts have attempted to sidestep the uncomfortable fact that most of us profess ourselves quite incapable of identifying the monetary equivalent of the lives of our sisters, daughters, mothers, and friends.
The framing of life in statistical terms has generated, for statistical
people, two disadvantages not suffered by those whose lives are not so
framed. First, the people whose lives are framed in statistical terms are
explicitly priced in advance of their deaths. Second, this pricing has
come to vary depending on the age, health, disability status, and wealth
of the people who might be harmed. Thus the most basic kind of rightthe right to be protected from physical harm caused by other people, on
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he right to be protected from physical harm caused by other people, on
equal terms with other people-is denied to those whose lives are framed
in statistical terms.
Despite the increasing importance of the concept of statistical life in
informing regulatory policy, regulatory scholars to date have not provided a standard definition of the statistical life. There are two possible
conceptions of statistical life. According to the first conception, a statistical life is a life expected to be lost as a function of probabilities of
death applied to a population of persons. On this understanding, the salient features of the statistical life are un identifiability and uncertainty: the
person who is expected to die is not identifiable before (or perhaps even
after) death, and the probabilistic estimates are uncertain. The second
conception of statistical life is that it is not a life at all, but only an aggregation of relatively small risks of harm to the individuals in a population. These risks can be summed, together with the size of the population, to estimate how many lives are likely to be lost as a result of the
risk. But, under this conception, "statistical life" refers to the collective
risk, not to life itself.
Neither of these two conceptions of the statistical life justifies the
differential treatment that regulatory policy has begun to afford statistical
and nonstatistical life. Identifiability does not explain our differing responses to situations that threaten the lives of others; our varying reactions likely have more to do with identifying with the victim of the threat.
Moreover, any person in a situation of risk can be framed in statistical or
nonstatistical terms. Making regulatory policy turn on this framing
threatens to ratify the apathy or prejudice society may exhibit toward
certain kinds of people or certain kinds of risks. As for uncertainty, the
analytical devices that have sprung up around statistical lives-monetization according to willingness-to-pay and according to age, health, and
disability-simply have nothing to do with the uncertainty of estimates
of physical risk. Using monetary valuations, and discriminatory ones at
that, to adjust for scientific uncertainty cloaks scientific uncertainty in the
garb of moral choice. It is, among other things, a strange commentary on
our times that it has proven easier to persuade regulatory agencies to
abandon their longstanding commitment to the equal worth of human
lives than it has proven to persuade them that their scientific analysis is
unsound.
The idea that a statistical life is really not a life at all, but only an
aggregation of relatively small risks of harm, also does not justify differential treatment of statistical and nonstatistical lives. Close examination
of the manipulations analysts perform on the monetary valuation of statistical life-including discounting and adjusting for life-years savedreveals that these analysts in fact treat statistical lives as lives, and not
merely as collections of small risks. Since the statistical life, according to
this second conception, turns out to be a life after all, and not simply an

HeinOnline -- 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 190 2000

2000]

The Rights of Statistical People

191

aggregation of risks, the ground for distinguishing it from nonstatistical
lives evaporates.
1. DISCRIMINATORY PRICING

Much modern regulation aims to prevent people from being killed
by the actions of other people. In discussing the benefits of this kind of
regulation, regulators often refer to the lives of the people who would
have died without the regulation as "statistical."! Below, this Comment
will develop and explore several different possible meanings of statistical
life. For now, I would like to establish how important the modifier "statistical" has become in influencing the discourse concerning life-saving
measures. In particular, I will try to show how common it has become to
strip statistical lives of rights against harm enjoyed by those whose lives
are not described in statistical terms.
People whose lives are described in statistical terms suffer from two
large disadvantages. First, the lives of statistical people are explicitly
priced in advance of their deaths. We are told, for example, that the life
of a statistical person is worth $5.8 million to the Environmental Protection Agency,2 $2.5 million to the Department of Transportation,3 and
$5 million to the Consumer Product Safety Commission.4 The analysts
who have helped develop these monetary values readily explain that the
values do not apply to "identified" lives, nor to the deaths of "named individuals," but only to "statistical" lives.s They deny having any special
knowledge of the value of identified lives, and they appear to tolerate, if
not embrace, the widely held assumption that we will do more to avoid
the death of an identified person than to avoid the death of a statistical
person. 6 As a result, identified lives remain unpriced while statistical
lives wear price tags.
1. For a recent example, see Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles:
Proposed Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 26,004, 26,079 (1999) (to be codified at 40 C.P.R. pts. 80, 8586).
2. See Radon in Drinking Water Health Risk Reduction and Cost Analysis, 64 Fed.
Reg. 9560, 9576 (1999).
3. See Memorandum from Walter B. McCormick, Jr., General Counsel, U.S. Dep't
of Transp., & Jeffrey N. Shane, Assistant Secretary for Policy and Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of Transp., to Assistant Secretaries and Modal Adm'rs, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Treatment of
Value of Life and Injuries in Preparing Economic Evaluations 2 (Jan. 8, 1993) (on file with
the Harvard Environmental Law Review) [hereinafter McCormick & Shane].
4. See U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, ESTIMATING THE COST TO SOCIETY
OF CONSUMER PRODUCT INJURIES: THE REVISED INJURY COST MODEL 6-8 (Jan. 1998).
5. See W. Kip VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR RISK 21 (1992) [hereinafter VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS]; Thomas C. Schelling, The
Life You Save May Be Your Own, in THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCES
113 (1984).
6. See generally VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 5, at 21, 29.
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It might be argued that, in fact, our legal system prices identified
lives as well: the tort system has for many years effectively priced
identified human lives by awarding compensation for wrongful deaths. 7
Because the tort system responds to harms that have already occurred,
and because its remedy is money damages, the system faces a choice
between not providing financial compensation for wrongful deaths, because lives are priceless, or providing compensation for them and risking
damage to the belief that human lives are beyond price. Refusing to compensate at all for a death caused by wrongful action would seem a perverse way of giving force to a belief in the pricelessness of human life.
Thus tort law, at least, can plausibly place a monetary value on human
life for purposes of retrospective compensation, and at the same time
hold to the belief that human lives should remain, in a fundamental
sense, unpriced.
Resolving the contradiction between pricelessness and pricing when
a monetary value is placed on human lives in advance of death presents a
more difficult conundrum. In that case, the government in essence decides that it is not worth more than a certain finite sum of money to prevent someone from dying, even when death will come about through the
actions of another person, and even when the person being killed has
done nothing wrong. This proposition is equivalent to saying that a person can kill another person if it would cost too much to avoid killing her.
This is a striking proposition, and so far one that has been applied only to
lives described in statistical terms. Indeed, as mentioned above, the major
writers in the literature on the pricing of human lives take pains to emphasize that they are discussing only statistical lives. 8 Government analysts have been equally fastidious about the distinction between the value
of an identifiable life and the value of a statisticallife. 9
The second disadvantage to being a statistical person is that statistical lives are valued differently from each other on the basis of characteristics not used to distinguish among nonstatistical lives. Some analysts
lately have become dissatisfied with the practice of placing an equal
monetary value on all statistical lives. Lives are never saved, they ob7. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 89 (1985).
8. See, e.g., VISCUSI, FATAL ThADEOFFS, supra note 5, at 19.
9. An internal memo of the Department of Transportation advises:
Under limited circumstances, computational procedures in investment analyses
may require insertion of an explicit value for fatalities averted. In such limited
cases, the [willingness-to-pay] value can be used, but the accompanying text
should avoid implying that the Department has set a dollar price on lives or
injuries. Rather than saying something like, "The Office of the Secretary has

set the value of life at $2.5 million dollars ..." the preferable language would
be more like, "Economic research indicates that $2.5 million per statistical
life saved is a reasonable estimate ofpeople's willingness to pay for safety."
McCormick & Shane, supra note 3, at 4 (emphasis added).
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serve, but only prolonged, and thus, it only makes sense to ask by how
much regulation prolongs the lives it protects. lO Thus, we now see a parade of normally equality-minded writers extolling the virtues of evaluating regulatory action on the basis of the number of "quality-adjusted
life-years" saved by it.ll (Often the concept goes by the even more occlusive abbreviation "QALY.") This technical approach obscures its implications: that regulation saving the statistical lives of the elderly, the sick,
and the disabled will be a lower priority than regulation saving the statistical lives of the young, the healthy, and the able-bodied. One's age,
health, and disability status suddenly have become good grounds for distinguishing the value of one's life from another, for the explicit reason
that the lives of those situated on the undesirable side of the statuses of
age, health, and ability (the elderly, the sick, and the disabled) are worth
less than the lives on the desirable side. 12 And, although few analysts will
admit it, the upshot of the prevailing method for valuing statistical
lives-which asks how much individuals are willing to pay to reduce risk
in their own lives-also favors the statistical lives of the rich over the
statistical lives of the poor. 13
The disaggregation of statistical lives based on characteristics like
age, health, disability status, and wealth deserves notice not only because
of the inequality it facilitates, but also because it subtly alters the very
concept of statistical life. Although the concept of statistical life has several possible meanings, all of these meanings contain one common feature: a statistical life is an unidentified life. We do not know the names of
statistical people. Indeed, prior to the recent interest in disaggregating
statistical people, one would have said that we know nothing about statistical people except that they are humans. But now, we are beginning to
learn various facts about the statistical people whom regulation affects,
10. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 259, 260
(1997).

11. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 83-85 (1995).
12. The Food and Drug Administration recently described the benefits of a rule in
tenns of the "quality-adjusted life-days" affected by the rule. Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of the Proposed Rule to Require
Refrigeration of Shell Eggs at Retail and Safe Handling Labels, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,516,
36,522 (1999). The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has been slower to embrace
QALYs as the measure of the benefits of its rules. Compare Regulatory Impact Analysis
for the Petroleum Refineries NESHAP, EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards,
EPA-4521R-004, at 174 (Aug. 1995) (suggesting that "[l]ife years saved may be a more
relevant measure" of regulatory benefits than lives saved) with EPA, THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT: 1970 TO 1990, EPA Office of Air and Radiation, at ES-9
(1997) (noting problems associated with calculating life-saving benefits based on life-years
·saved).
13. See W. Kip Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for Judging Risk Regulation Policies, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 431, 447 (1994) ("[T]he United States Department of
Transportation should want to place a higher value of life on the well-being of the lives of
airline passengers than those killed in motor-vehicle crashes because the airline passengers
have a higher income:').
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such as whether they are young or old, healthy or unhealthy. We should
expect that, if this disaggregation continues, we will soon know whether
the statistical lives relevant to a regulatory decision are men or women,
white or black, infants or preschoolers.
The evaluation of life expectancy alone has the potential to introduce many such specific features of a person's identity into the regulatory
equation. A large lurking question, neglected in the recent rush to embrace QALYs, is what baseline level of life expectancy to use in calculating the life-years lost due to a given hazard. 14 In keeping with the
whole premise of the QALY movement-that only the portion of life
actually lost due to regulation should concern regulators-there is good
reason to expect that the baseline level will be the life expectancy of the
group to which the affected people belong, insofar as group identity is an
important determinant of life expectancy. IS Thus, one can imagine race,
ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender, and other life expectancy-related
characteristics all being fed, quite invisibly, into the equation that determines the worth of a person's life. In this way, the very identifiedness
that, when it comes to nonstatistical people, helps justify their equal
protection from harm, becomes, for statistical people, the very thing that
leads to inequality among them.
Whether consciously or unconsciously, analysts have softened the
discriminatory appearance of these analytic developments in two ways.
First, rather than using as a baseline the life expectancy of the specific
group to which the affected statistical people belong, analysts typically
use the average life expectancy of the whole population. For example, in
one influential analysis,16 Robert Hahn of the American Enterprise Institute calculated life-years saved by comparing the average age of death from
broad categories of hazards-such as "accident;' "fire," "worker injury," and
"cancer"-to estimates of the average life expectancy of the entire population of people of a given age. 17 The use of overall life expectancy as the
baseline for comparison avoids the awkward fact that life expectancy is
strongly associated with statuses like race, gender, disability, and socioeconomic status. While it may be that analysts like Hahn use overall life
expectancy rather than the specific life expectancy of the group to which

14. See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J.
2025,2062,2075-76 (1999).
15. Professor Revesz has proposed that regulatory analysts consider the "age
profiles" of the population targeted by regulation. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REv.
941,967 n.120 (1999).
16. The Office of Management and Budget relies heavily on Hahn's analysis in developing its own estimates of the costs and benefits of environmental regulation. See
OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 16 (1998).
17. See Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Refonn: What Do the Government's Numbers
Tell Us?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 208, 247 n.40 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996).
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the target population belongs as a means of avoiding inappropriate distinctions between classes of people, one must then wonder why the same
concern for equality does not persuade them to abandon the entire QALY
project. ls
A second way analysts have attempted to soften the discriminatory
thrust of currently popular methods of valuing human life is to avoid
making these valuations, and thus, life-saving policies, turn on ability,
rather than Willingness, to pay. In other words, they have tried to dilute
the effect of wealth on the valuation of life. Professor Kornhauser, for
example, suggests that life be valued according to the preferences of a
group that has an "acceptable" level of wealth, such as the median wealth
of the overall population. 19 Similarly, Professor Revesz proposes valuing
lives based on the preferences of a population having "representative
characteristics of the population of the United States," and argues that
valuations be adjusted upward where the subjects of willingness-to-pay
studies "have relatively low incomes" compared to the group targeted by
regulation. 20 Under both proposals, of course, wealth would still determine the Willingness to pay for risk reduction and thus the value of statistical life, but the value of life would be nudged upwards by excluding
the highly income-constrained preferences of the worst off among us.
Thus, analysts have obscured-but not eliminated-the unequal
protection of life afforded by identifying the features of human lives that
make them worth saving or not. Most important for present purposes,
however, is the fact that analysts have often used the bare adjective "statistical" to justify their pricing of, and discriminations among, human
lives. 21 What is it about statistical lives that supposedly makes them so
expendable? Answering this question requires an exploration of the different possible meanings of statistical life.
II.

UNIDENTIFIABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY

The literature on risk and its regulation contains two different conceptions of the statistical life. According to the first conception, the statistical life is a life expected to be lost as a function of probabilities of
death applied to a population of persons. The person expected to die is
not identifiable in advance of death, and the probabilistic estimates are
18. See Heinzeriing, Environmental Law and the Present Future, supra note 14, at
2075-76.
19. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Value of Life, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 209, 221-22
(1990).
20. Revesz, supra note 15, at 967-68.
21. See, e.g., Jeremy D. Fraiberg & Michael J. Trebilcock, Risk Regulation: Technocratic and Democratic Tools for Regulatory Refonn, 43 MCGILL L.J. 835, 860 (1998);
James F. Blumstein, Rational Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy
Analysis, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1345, 1353-54 (1981).
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uncertain. 22 However, neither unidentifiability nor uncertainty justifies
differential protection against harm for statistical and nonstatistical peo~
pIe.
A. Un identifiability
One of the features thought to set the statistical life apart from the
nonstatisticallife is unidentifiability. We will spend a fortune, it is regu~
lady remarked, to rescue miners trapped in a mine, or a little girl trapped
in a well, or a downed balloonist, but we will not spend an equivalent
amount to protect these people from getting in harm's way in the first
place.23 Observers have asserted that the identifiedness of the miners, the
little girl, and the balloonist makes us especially willing to help them.24
As an empirical matter, this assertion is unproved and probably mistaken.
As a normative matter, it seems clear that the rights of people not to be
harmed should not depend on the identifiedness of the people who will be
harmed.
There is good reason to believe that our willingness to spend money,
time, and other resources to save someone from harm does not turn on
the identifiedness of the person who will be harmed unless we intervene.
When Tylenol capsules were contaminated with cyanide and placed on
the market in the fall of 1982, no one knew which capsules contained the
cyanide. Accordingly, no one knew who would be poisoned if no preventive measures were taken. This unidentifiedness did not soften the response that followed the first poisonings. Indeed, it arguably magnified it,
as unidentifiedness is a close cousin of the awful randomness-associated with terrorists and criminal maniacs-that many people uniquely
fear.25
Contrast our response to the Tylenol poisonings with an equally familiar response to an identified life. Many of us who live in large urban
areas come face to face, weekly if not daily, with homeless people who
look cold, hungry, desperate, and sick. Often these people explicitly ask
for our help and we do not give it. Or we give a little-a dime, a quarter,
a dollar or two-enough to assuage our consciences but not enough
really to help. Yet it is hard to imagine a more clearly identified person in
need.

22. Scholars who appear to embrace this conception of a statistical life include,
among many others, Charles Fried and W. Kip Viscusi. See VISCUSI, supra note 5, at 21.
See generally Charles Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1969).
23. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 20-21 (1978);
Fried, supra note 22, at 1415.
24. See Fried, supra note 22, at 1428-33 (labeling this the "personalist" argument).
25. See Murder by Capsule, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,1982, at A30.
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The different responses to the Tylenol poisonings and to the homeless raise the possibility that the "identifiedness" that increases our willingness to save others from harm has little to do with our being able to
identify the victim of harm. Rather, it probably has more to do with our
being able to identify with her. Making individual-or, worse, publicresponsibility to aid another person turn on the extent to which the
person who needs help is like the people who might help her is a covert,
but effective, way of making characteristics like race, class, gender, age,
and personal habits determinative of our obligations to others. This
approach is, needless to say, the antithesis of a regime of rights. In this
way, the issue of identifiability also bears a strong resemblance to the
unequal treatment of statistical people. People whose lives are framed in
statistical terms thus suffer twice: first, when their lives are labeled
statistical simply because the people doing the labeling do not identify
with them, and second, when their lives are devalued precisely because
they are statistical.
The possibility that the word "statistical" will be used as cover for
an unconscious or invidious failure to identify with the person in danger
is heightened by the fact that virtually any person in a situation of danger
can be described in either statistical (unidentified) or nonstatistical
(identified) terms. The classification of a threatened person as statistical
or nonstatisticallargely turns on one's definition of the harm the person
faces and its cause. In the case of the homeless person, for example, one
might say that the harms this person faces are acute hunger and exposure
to the elements, and that the causes of these harms are inadequate food,
clothing, and shelter. These are immediate harms, readily addressed by
interventions anyone of us might make. But if one says that the harm the
homeless person suffers is poverty, and the causes are a lack of education, mental illness, and societal discrimination, then simple interventions seem inadequate indeed. Thus, if the obligation to help turns on
whether the life of the person in need of help is framed in statistical or
nonstatistical terms, we can give that obligation any shape and scope we
want through our definition of harm and causation. And, oddly enough,
the more chronic, intractable, and widespread the harm as we describe
it-the more "statistical" the harm and its cause-the less will be the
responsibility to intervene.
Returning, finally, to the paradigmatic cases of the identified victim-the trapped miner, the little girl in a well, the downed balloonist-it
becomes obvious upon reflection that identifiedness-as in, what is the
person's name? what does she look like?-probably has little to do with
our willingness to help. Rescue workers traveled halfway across the
world to try to locate survivors of the massive earthquake that hit Turkey
in August 1999, yet most of those people found were not identifiable in
advance of their rescues. They were known only by their cries for help.
In that case, the important factor was that there was no doubt that the
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people buried in the rubble of the quake were in grave danger. The
knowledge that might distinguish these victims from other people in
need, therefore, is not knowledge of their personal identities, but knowledge of their need for help. Perhaps it is uncertainty, then, that distinguishes the statistical from the nonstatisticallife.
B. Uncertainty

Suppose one million people are each exposed to a hazard estimated
to pose a one-in-one-million risk of death. One life would be the expected loss to this population facing this probability of death. To say that
this life is "statistical" might mean one of two things. Both relate to the
uncertainty of the probabilistic estimate.
In one sense, the word "statistical" is a kind of pejorative; it often
connotes an association that is contingent or random rather than intrinsic
or causal. For example, suppose that ninety percent of all airplane
crashes in the last two decades occurred on Tuesdays, yet only five percent of all airplane flights occurred on Tuesdays. Suppose further that
regression analyses of the facts surrounding airplane crashes rule out, to
a ninety-five percent certainty, the possibility that the association between flying on Tuesdays and airplane crashes is random. Yet assume
that researchers lack any theory about why Tuesdays are especially dangerous for air travel. One might then regard estimates of the number of
lives expected to be lost during Tuesday airplane flights as estimates of
the loss of "statistical" life because the association between Tuesdays
and crashes has been established only statistically.
This meaning of statistical life does not justify the monetization of,
nor discrimination between, statistical lives. At most, the idea that statistical lives are different because the threat to them has been probabilistically identified, but not causally explained, suggests that we should proceed cautiously in our response to the hazard. If we believe that the probabilistic association we have identified is coincidental rather than causal,
then we would be well advised to study the matter further before undertaking a major regulatory intervention. But if the statistical probabilities
have been established over a large enough number of cases, in different
settings, then the lack of a causal theory explaining the statistical association between the two events should not stop us from taking action. For
example, it was not until 1996 that scientists identified the mechanistic
link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer.26 Prior to that time, the
connection between smoking and cancer had been established only statistically, through decades of epidemiological and biological research.
26. See Mikhail F. Denissenko et aI., Preferential Formation oj Benzo[a}pyrene Ad·
ducts at Lung Cancer Mutational Hotspots in P53, 274 SCI. 430, 430 (1996).
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Yet the absence of a causal theory did not prevent widespread acceptance
of the idea that smoking causes lung cancer.27
More fundamentally, cautiousness in the face of uncertainty is not
the same as a distinction based on value. If scientific uncertainty is the
issue, then the solution is not to declare that statistical lives are less important, less valuable, more expendable, than nonstatistical lives, or that
the age or health or wealth of the people who might be harmed should
inform our willingness to help them. Monetization of human life and
distinctions among humans based on age, health, disability, and wealth,
have nothing to do with the meaning of statistical life that I am here considering. If the uncertainty of probabilistic estimates distinguishes statistical from nonstatistical life, then this uncertainty should be inserted in
the regulatory equation as an adjustment to the probabilities themselves,
and not as an adjustment to the value being measured. Doing otherwise
allows scientific disagreement over the existence and magnitude of risk
to masquerade as a value choice about who in our society is worth saving
and at what cost.
Scientific uncertainty also may underlie another conception of statistical life. Even where there exists a causal theory as to why one
event-say, exposure to asbestos-produces an adverse result, there may
be disagreement over the conditions under which the adverse result will
materialize. A statistical life might therefore be the life expected to be
lost if each of a series of assumptions about the world holds true. But
because the assumptions are uncertain, the loss of life is uncertain, too.
Modern risk assessment, which forms the basis of much healthrelated regulation, attempts to determine the probability of future harm to
individuals exposed to particular hazards. 28 This analysis requires many
assumptions about the potency of the hazard, the magnitude of exposures, and the susceptibility of the individuals to the harm in question.
Often the assumptions must be made in the absence of conclusive proof.
For example, many risk assessments attempt to determine the probability
of cancer in a human population exposed to a particular substance by
considering the effect of that substance on an animal population, such as
rats or mice. 29 Extrapolating the results in animal studies to the human
27. See Denise Grady, So, Smoking Causes Cancer: This Is News?, N.Y. 'liMES, Oct.
27,1996, at D3. See also American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027,1055-56 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (rejecting the argument that the EPA could not regulate fine particulate pollution
until it established the "biological mechanism through which particulate pollution causes
adverse health effects").
28. The literature on quantitative risk assessment is enormous. For general discussion, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT
(1994).
29. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (upholding the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's rule limiting
workplace exposure to ethylene oxide, based on animal studies); Synthetic Organic Chern.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 720 F. Supp. 1244, 1256 (W.D. La.
1989) (upholding Health and Human Service's classification of certain chemicals as known
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population requires an assumption about the similarity between the relevant responses of animals and humans. 3o Risk assessments must also, to
take another example, attempt to predict what level of exposure the relevant human population will experience with regard to the substance in
question. Will the individuals in the population eat the substance, drink
it, breathe it, or all of these and more? How often? For how many days or
weeks or years? These are difficult questions to answer in advance. Risk
assessors must therefore make assumptions about what the future exposures will be to estimate the risk the population faces. 31
Often these assumptions lean in the direction of assumptions that
will support findings of more rather than less risk. The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration routinely assumes, for example, that
worker populations exposed to a risky substance will be so exposed for
their entire working lives; in other words, the workers will neither switch
occupations nor quit working altogether nor limit their exposures in another way.32 In fact, many workers do spend their working lives at one
facility or at one type of facility, thus experiencing similar exposures
throughout their years of work. 33 Yet this kind of assumption has led to
several memorable depictions of the kinds of people risk assessment assumes -to exist. Justice Breyer, for example, brought us the "dirt-eating
children playing in . . . a swamp" by way of arguing that the government's decisions to clean up hazardous waste sites are often extravagant. 34 More recently, John Applegate has conjured the image of the "naked dirt-eating farmer," assumed in Environmental Protection Agency
analyses of the risks from a nuclear weapons production facility in
Ohio-a farmer who consumes the food, and some of the soil, from his
own farm, and in the meantime covers his naked body with the farm's
soiJ.35
Although no one has said so explicitly, I believe that the practice of
using these kinds of assumptions in risk assessment may be what lies
behind the demotion of "real" human lives to "statistical" lives. It may be

or suspected carcinogens based on results in animal studies).
30. For discussion of this assumption, see Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk
Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,966-68 (1996) (proposed Apr. 23,1996).
31. See, e.g., Leather Indus. of Am. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392, 403-05 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(remanding an EPA rule for failure "to demonstrate a rational relationship between its
highly conservative exposure assumptions and the actual usage regulated by those assumptions").
32. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 46 (1993).
33. Cj. Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The
Risky Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 351 (1995)
(explaining why a similar assumption about residential exposures is not overly conservative).
34. See BREYER, supra note 32, at 12.
35. See John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not and End in Itself: The Role of Risk
Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1654 (1995).
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the reason why writers who normally would cringe at distinguishing
among people based on characteristics like age and class find no
difficulty embracing such distinctions when it comes to statistical people.
The idea, I think, is this: statistical people do not exist. There are no dirteating children living in swamps and no naked dirt-eating Ohioan farmers. To be sure, there are children living near hazardous waste sites and
near nuclear weapons facilities, but there are no children and no adults
who do the things risk assessment imagines them to do. Thus, the statistical people of risk assessment exist only on paper; there is no person, no
name, no face, no body, that could be matched to them even if one had
perfect information. Consequently, to say that a statistical life is expected
to be lost as a result of a particular hazard is to say that, in reality, no one
will die.
If statistical people truly do not exist, if statistical deaths truly do
not occur, a qualitative distinction between statistical and nonstatistical
lives would indeed be justified. But the qualitative distinction would be
the same as that between zero and any positive number. It would not be a
distinction that would, for example, support attaching a monetary value
to statistical but not nonstatisticallives. If nonstatisticallives truly do not
exist, they are not worth $5 million, or $2.5 million, or in fact, anything
at all; they have no value. The idea that statistical people do not exist also
would not support distinctions among statistical people; it is incoherent,
for example, to make age- or health-based distinctions between nonexistent people. Thus, once again, the meaning of statistical life that derives
from scientific uncertainty does not justify the analytical practices that
have accompanied the framing of life in statistical terms.
One might object that even if some statistical deaths do occur-even
if quantitative risk assessment sometimes correctly predicts some loss of
life-quantitative risk assessment vastly overstates the number of deaths
likely to occur. But if the conservatism of quantitative risk assessment
means only that fewer people may die than we expect-not zero, but
fewer-then this uncertainty does not justify the qualitative difference in
the treatment of statistical and nonstatistical lives that I have discussed.
Only if the actual loss of life is zero-only if no one will die-can the
situations of the statistical and nonstatisticallives be regarded as qualitatively distinct. And, as I have said, they would not be qualitatively distinct in the way analysts have imagined.
It would be difficult, however, to support the claim of zero risk.
Many other assumptions commonly used in risk assessments are just as
artificial as the ones I have described, but they are artificial in a way that
likely understates rather than overstates actual risk. For example, one
standard assumption in risk assessment is that the population targeted by
regulation has the same susceptibility to the relevant harm as the popula-
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tion studied in the risk assessment. 36 Yet most of the epidemiological
studies underlying the risk assessments used in developing regulation
have involved only white male workers; women, children, the elderly,
racial and ethnic minorities, and poor people may be more vulnerable to
the risks in question than the relatively healthy white male workers assumed in most analyses. 37 The dueling assumptions of risk assessmentsome conservative, some not-provide little support for the notion that
statistical lives (and deaths) simply do not exist.
The necessity of maintaining the zero-risk scenario, which justifies
a qualitative distinction between statistical and nonstatistical lives, may
help to explain the incredible durability of scientific disagreement in environmental and health regulation. A quarter-century after the pesticide
DDT was banned, there appears to be no universal agreement that the
pesticide was, all things considered, harmful enough to be banned;38 the
same is true of the two-decade-old ban on PCBs.39 Indeed, there is likely
no industrial chemical or substance as to the harmfulness of which everyone of any influence would agree. Equally striking, even when claims of
the direct harmfulness of a substance are quite undeniable, these claims
are almost inevitably opposed by the claim that regulating the substance
would at least indirectly harm the same health-related interests as much
as, or more than, the substance itself. For example, in the handful of
cases in which federal courts have struck down health regulations on the
ground that the regulations took inadequate account of costs, the courts
have coupled their economic conclusions with the suggestion that the
regulations would not, in any event, have saved lives on balance, but
more likely would have taken more lives than they saved. 40 This kind of
reasoning is exactly the kind of "subterfuge" Calabresi and Bobbitt
would predict to occur in this kind of situation;41 it would, I think, be an
unusual judge who could say explicitly and unqualifiedly that people will
die because he struck down a regulation-and that this is fine, because
the regulation cost too much money. The long latency period of many of
36. See Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. at
17,966.

37. See, e.g., id.; see also Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications
a/Quantitative RiskAssessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 123.
38. See George M. Gray & John D. Graham, Regulating Pesticides, ill RISK VERSUS
RISK: ThADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 173, 173-74, 179, 189
(John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
39. See BREYER, supra note 32, at 17,92 n.72.
40. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (invalidating EPA's ban on asbestos on grounds that the rule may require spending an unreasonably large amount of money to save a human life and also may have created more risks than
it avoided because nonasbestos brakes may not be as effective as asbestos brakes); American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invalidating EPA's national
air quality standard for ozone on grounds that EPA failed to articulate an intelligible limiting principle for its standard and that ozone may be beneficial to human health because
pollution may block cancer-causing ultraviolet radiation).
41. See generally CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 23.
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the human diseases prevented by environmental and health regulation
helps to preserve the subterfuge, as latency frustrates efforts to make a
clear and crisp causal connection between exposure and harm. If the
subterfuge were abandoned, if the zero-risk scenario were ever eliminated, it would become clear that human lives are being priced in advance of their deaths, based on explicit classifications the legal system
normally would eschew.
Thus, preserving the zero-risk hypothesis by emphasizing and perhaps fomenting scientific disagreement maintains the qualitative distinction between statistical and nonstatisticallives. I repeat, however, that the
qualitative distinction thus maintained-between real lives and nonexistent ones-does not justify the analytical devices that have been developed for statistical lives, namely monetization based on age, health, disability, and wealth.
In sum, neither identifiability nor scientific uncertainty justifies the
differential treatment of statistical and nonstatistical lives. Perhaps another way of conceptualizing the statistical life would justify this treatment.
III.

RISK

The second conception of the statistical life is that it is really not a
life at all, but merely an aggregation of relatively small risks of harm to
the individuals in a population. These risks can be summed, in combination with the size of the population, to determine how many lives are
likely to be lost as a result of the risks. But, under this conception, "statistical life" refers to the collective risk, not to the life itself. According
to this second understanding of the statistical life, a statistical life is indeed qualitatively different from a nonstatistical life because it is not a
life at all but only a collection of risks.
This second approach is adopted, formally at least, by the analysts
who advocate valuing life-saving measures according to individuals'
willingness to pay.42 These analysts note that while it is difficult to persuade people to think rationally and economically about the certain prospect of their own deaths, they can think rationally and economically
about small increments of risk. 43 To put the idea in concrete terms: if
each person in a population of 1000 faces a 111000 risk of death from a
particular hazard, and each person is willing to pay $5 to eliminate this
risk to herself, then the value of a "statistical life" in this population is
$5,000. But, as analysts repeatedly remind us, it is the collection of 1000

42. See W. KIp VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 45-46 (1998).
43. The seminal discussion is Schelling's. See Schelling, supra note 5, at 126-28.
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risks of 111000, and not life itself, being valued here. 44 In practice, however, analysts treat the valuation achieved by consulting willingness-topay as a valuation of life itself. Since the statistical life, according to this
second conception, thus turns out to be a life after all, and not just a collection of risks, the ground for distinguishing it from nonstatistical lives
disappears.
One way in which analysts treat the valuation of risk as equivalent
to a valuation of life is that they do not calculate the value of both statistical life and life itself. 45 They calculate only the value of statistical life.
They do not go on to observe that their calculations drastically understate
the value of their programs because they measure only the value of risk
and not the value of life. The value of a discrete risk, however, remains
the same regardless of whether anyone actually ends up dying as a result
of that risk. Risk and death are two separate injuries. 46 If analysts behaved consistently with their claim that the monetary value of a statistical
life reflects only risk and not life itself, they would either substantially
upgrade their estimates of the benefits of life-saving programs by, for
example, adding some measure of the loss of life itself (a rather outdated
possibility would be the measure of lifetime earnings lost as a result of
premature death),47 or by acknowledging in every case that their estimates of the value of life-saving programs are dramatically understated
because they reflect only risk and not life. Analysts do neither of these
two things. It is hard, therefore, to escape the impression that, despite
their protestations to the contrary, they do indeed believe they have found
the measure of the value of life and not just risk.
Second, analysts commonly discount the monetary value of statistical life to reflect the temporal lag, if any, between the costs and benefits
of regulation. 48 But rather than discounting from the moment when risk is
imposed, they discount from the probable moment of death. In fact, the
Office of Management and Budget recommends this practice.49 If, how44. See, e.g., VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY, slIpra note 42, at 45; Richard Thaler
& Sherwin Rosen, The Vallie of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market, ill

HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 265-66 (Nestor E. Terleckyj ed., 1976).
45. Indeed, if analysts did calculate the value of life itself according to the same
compensation theory of value that underlies the valuation of risk, the benefits of regulatory
programs that save human lives would be infinite, as "no finite amount of money could
compensate a person for the loss of his life, simply because money is no good to him when
he is dead." John Broome, Trying to Vallie a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 92 (1978).
46. See generally Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present FIIII/re, sl/pra
note 14, at 2029-46, 2061-63.
47. For discussion, see CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & THOMAS D. HOPKINS, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL AGENCY VALUATIONS OF HUMAN
LIFE, REPORT FOR RECOMMENDATION 88-7 (1988).
48. For discussion, see Lisa Heinzerling, Discollnting Ollr Flltllre, 34 LAND & W ATER L. REV. 39 (1999).
49. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, INTERAGENCY GROUP CHAIRED
BY A MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866, at pt. m.B.5(a) (Jan. 11, 1996)
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ever, monetary valuations of statistical life indeed represent only risk,
and not life, then it is inappropriate to discount the value of statistical life
from the probable date of death rather than from the date a risk is created. 50
Third, the practice of disaggregating statistical lives into statistical
life-years seems more consistent with the idea that a statistical life is a
whole human life, than with the idea it is an aggregation of individual
risks of death. Human lives are composed, in part, of years lived; risk is
not. Although it might be argued that the value of a risk to individuals
depends in part on how many years of life will be lost if one dies, the
value of statistical life-years is not currently calculated in this manner.
Instead, analysts estimate the value of a life-year by simply annualizing
the value of a statistical life.5l They rarely attempt to individualize the
valuations of life-years to take into account the special characteristics of
the risk in question. A jarring example of this insensitivity to context
comes from the economic analysis of the Food and Drug Administration's rule on mammography quality standards. After noting that
$5 million was "the implied value of society's Willingness to pay to avoid
the likelihood of an additional death," the agency stated:
However, FDA recognizes that the studies upon which this estimate
is based were conducted, for the most part, on male, blue-collar
workers of approximately 30 years of age. At 30 years of age, the
average male life expectancy is 44.2 years. Thus, the estimate implies that individuals are willing to pay $5 million for 44.2 years of
life. Amortizing $5 million over 44.2 years using a 7 percent discount rate yields an unadjusted average annual value per life-year
of $368,000. Adjusting the life expectancy of a 30-year-old male to
account for future non-bed and bed disability ... yields an expectation of 41.3 QALYs. Thus, FDA assumes that the average annual
value of one QALY, using a 7 percent discount rate, equals
$373,000.52
Thus, the agency estimated the value of life-saving mammography in
women with breast cancer based on the amount thirty-year-old male
workers are estimated to demand in higher wages given the possibility of
workplace accidents. By disaggregating the value of a statistical life into
statistical life-years without any consideration of the special qualities of
[hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
50. See Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, supra note 48, at 71; Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911, 1913 (1999).
51. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 49, at pt. ill.B.5(c).
52. Executive Summary, Economic Analysis of U.S. Food and Drug Administration's Final Rule Under the Mammography Quality Standards Act of 1992, at 5-26 (on file
with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (citations omitted).
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the risk in question, the agency strongly suggested that it is striving toward a uniform, acontextual valuation of lives and life-years that is inconsistent with the premise that only risk-contingent, case-specific,
fluidly perceived risk-is being valued.
In acknowledging the monetary value of reducing risk, economic
analysts have contributed to our growing awareness that life-threatening
risk itself-and not just the end result of such risk, death-is an injury.
But they have erred in pretending that risk is all there is. The fundamental problem with the conception of statistical life as risk, not life, is the
same as the problem with defining statistical life in terms of uncertainty:
it implicitly assumes that statistical people do not die. 53 Because this is a
question of science, not value, any attempt to resolve it through the
monetization of, and differential valuation of, statistical lives, is to create
a mismatch between the problem, if there is one, and its solution. In addition, because risk itself is an injury, it is wrong to allocate exposure to
it based on characteristics like age, health, and wealth.
As I have explained, economic analysts do not act consistently with
their assertions that they are valuing only risk and not life. In failing to
develop an estimate for the value of life separate and apart from the value
of risk, in discounting from the end of life rather than from the beginning
of risk, and in treating life-years as components of life rather than risk,
these analysts belie the truth of their assertions that their concern is with
risk rather than life itself. Perhaps this is a way of trying to reconcile a
very awkward tension in their methodology. By the analysts' own account, individuals are capable of rationally and economically valuing
only risk, not life itself. An economic account of life-saving programs
that excluded the value of life would be quite inadequate, however. By
proclaiming that risk is their concern, but by in fact treating the valuations they derive as valuations of life itself, economic analysts have managed to have it both ways. They have retained the theoretical plausibility
of the willingness-to-pay methodology, but have put it in the service of a
system that appears, for all the world, to have arrived at the value of life
itself. This strategy must fail. To the extent that the willingness-to-pay
methodology can indeed value only risk and not life, it omits a largeprobably the largest-benefit of life-saving regulation. Yet to the extent
that it purports to value life, it is inconsistent with its own theoretical
premises.

53. Throughout this Comment I have spoken only of the risk of death, and death that
is associated with the hazards regulated by federal agencies. But of course many of the
risks that can lead to death also cause other serious problems, including illnesses that are
painful and debilitating. See Lisa Heinzerling, Reglliatory Costs of Mythic Proportions,
107 YALE L.J. 1981,2060-63 (1998). In focusing on death here, I do not mean to slight the
other harms caused by modem hazards.
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CONCLUSION

Regulatory analysts have predicated their pricing of, and discriminations among, human lives on the idea that the lives protected by regulation are statistical. By this, they either mean that no lives will be lost or
that only risk, not life itself, is at stake. In either case, the notion is that
statistical people do not die. But this is true only if our scientific estimates of risk are so unreliable that they commonly predict deaths will
occur where, in fact, none will. I believe this is an inaccurate, even hysterical, account of scientific uncertainty. In any event, if the problem
were scientific uncertainty, the solution would not be to monetize the
lives subject to an uncertain risk, nor to discriminate among them based
on characteristics such as age, health, and wealth. The solution would be
to develop better scientific estimates of risk.
In defending the monetization of, and discrimination among, human
lives based on the statistical nature of those lives, economic analysts have
dehumanized the suffering and death that scientific risk assessments tell
us will occur due to particular hazards. It is hard to understand, much
less empathize with, statistical pain and loss. It is easier to assume that
statistical suffering and death are things that do not happen to us-real
people-but only to others-statistical people-and then to assume that
the other people-statistical people-do not exist. Describing pain and
loss in statistical terms allows us to think coolly about them; it strips lifethreatening risks of the moral and emotional texture they derive from
their association with real humans with real bodies and real loved ones.
Describing human lives in statistical terms thus creates the conditions
under which human suffering and loss can be conceived of in economic
terms, and under which this suffering and loss can be allowed to continue
simply because the monetary value we have attached to them is lower
than the costs of avoiding them. In inventing the statistical life, economic
analysis has contrived the very entity it seeks to value.
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